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Abstract 
Context. Service-oriented architecture and its microservice-based approach increase an attack surface of applications. Exposed 
microservices become a pivot point for advanced persistent threats and completely change the threat landscape. Correctly 
implemented authentication and authorization architecture patterns are basis of any software maturity program. 
Objective. The aim of this study is to provide a helpful resource to application security architect and developers on existing 
architecture patterns to implement authentication and authorization in microservices-based systems. 
Method. In this paper, we conduct a review of major electronic databases and libraries as well as security standards and 
presentations at the major security conferences. 
Results. In this work based on research papers and major security conferences presentations analysis we identified industry 
best practices in authentication and authorization patterns and its applicability depending on environment characteristic. For 
each described patterns we reviewed its advantages and disadvantages that could be used as decision-making criteria for 
application security architects during architecture design phase. 
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1 Introduction 
The microservice architecture is being increasingly used for designing and implementing application 
systems in both cloud-based and on-premise infrastructures, high-scale applications and services [1]. 
There are many security challenges need to be addressed in the application design and implementation 
phases. The fundamental security requirements that have to be addressed during design phase are 
authentication and authorization. Therefore it is vital for applications security architects to understand 
and properly use existing architecture patterns to implement authentication and authorization in 
microservices-based systems. The goal of our research was to identify such patterns and to do 
recommendations for applications security architect on possible way to use it. This study is conducted 
with three main questions in mind: 
 Which architecture patterns to implement authentication and authorization have been reported 
in microservice-based systems researches? 
 What advantages and disadvantages do existing architecture patterns have? 
 What should application security architect take in mind while selecting pattern to implement 
authentication and authorization in microservice-based systems? 
We reviewed major electronic databases and libraries (IEEE Xplorer, ACM Digital Library, SpringerLink) 
with research papers to extract primary studies. In order to explore these databases and presentations, 
we used search strings containing “authentication”, “authorization”, “service-oriented architecture” and 
“microservice” (in different spelling, like “micro-service” or “micro service”) words. To avoid missing 
relevant studies, we also reviewed security standards, presentations at the major security conferences. 
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions: 
 a state of the art of the authentication and authorization architecture patterns for microservice-
based systems (Section 2); 
 recommendations for applications security architect on how to select an appropriated 
architecture pattern (Section 3). 
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2 Authentication and authorization architecture patterns 
We made decomposition of authentication and authorization functions based on microservice-specific 
characteristics and identified the following list of security sub-functions (Figure 1): edge-level 
authorization, service-level authorization, external entity identity propagation and service-to-service 
authentication. Then we reviewed major electronic databases and libraries as well as security standards 
and presentations at the major security conferences in order to identify existing architectural patterns. 
 
Figure 1 Authentication and authorizationsubfunctions in microservice-based systems 
2.1 Edge-level authorization 
In simple scenario authorization can happen only at the edge level (API gateway). The API gateway can 
be leveraged to centralize enforcement of authorization for all downstream microservices, eliminating 
the need to provide authentication and access control for each of the individual services [2]. In such 
case, NIST recommends [3] to implement mitigating controls such as mutual authentication to prevent 
direct, anonymous connections to the internal services (API gateway bypass). It should be noted that 
authorization at the edge layer has a following drawbacks [4]: 
 pushing all authorization decisions to API gateway can quickly become hard to manage in 
complex ecosystems with many roles and access control rules; 
 API gateway may become a single-point-of-decision that may violate “defense in depth” 
principle; 
 operation teams typically own the API gateway, so development teams can not directly make 
authorization changes, slowing down velocity due to the additional communication and process 
overhead. 
In most cases, development teams implement authorization in both places - at the edge level at a coarse 
level of granularity and service level [5]. To authenticate external entity edge can use access tokens 
(referenced token or self-contained token) transmitted via HTTP headers (e.g. “Cookie” or 
“Authorization”) or use mTLS [6]. 
2.2 Service-level authorization 
For further discussion, we use terms and definitions (Figure 2) according with NIST [7]. The functional 
components of access control system can be classified following way: 
 Policy Administration Point (PAP) provides a user interface for creating, managing, testing, and 
debugging access control rules;  
 Policy Decision Point (PDP) computes access decisions by evaluating the applicable access 
control policy; 
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 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) enforces policy decisions in response to a request from a subject 
requesting access to a protected object; 
 Policy Information Point (PIP) serves as the retrieval source of attributes, or the data required 
for policy evaluation to provide the information needed by the PDP to make the decisions. 
 
Figure 2 Access control management functional points [7] 
Service-level authorization gives each microservice more control to enforce access control policies. 
Based on review of [4, 6, 8, 9] we identified the following types of service-level authorization: 
 decentralized pattern; 
 centralized pattern with a single Policy Decision Point (PDP); 
 centralized pattern with an embedded PDP. 
2.2.1 Decentralized pattern 
In that pattern development team implements PDP and PEP directly at microservice code level (Figure 
3). All the access control rules and as well as attributes that need to implement that rule are defined and 
stored on the each microservice (step 1). When microservice receives (step 2) request along with some 
authorization metadata (e.g., end-user context), microservice analyzes it (step 3) in order to generate 
access control policy decision and then enforces authorization (step 4). 
 
Figure 3 Decentralized pattern high-level architecture 
Existing programming language frameworks allow development teams to implement authorization at 
the microservice layer. Implementing authorization at the source code level means that the code must 
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be updated whenever development team want to modify authorization logic and has following 
limitation [4, 10]: 
 each development team must clearly understand security features of using programming 
language framework and implement its correctly in their microservices; 
 each development team must clearly understand access control policy and expected 
permissions for a role/group that may be challenging task because the decisions are potentially 
littered through one or more large, complicated code bases; 
 this pattern relies on the careful manual configuration by the development team, which is error-
prone; besides that, due to the large scale of modern microservice applications, it is unrealistic 
for the development team to configure and maintain access control policies for every 
microservice; 
 source code changes require solid regression testing for authorization bugs detection. 
On the other hand implementing access control policy in the microservice code allows developers to 
enforce more fine granting access control because rules that govern authorization are more domain 
specific [8]. 
2.2.2 Centralized pattern with single policy decision point 
In that pattern access control rules are defined, stored, and evaluated centrally (Figure 4). Access 
control rules is defined using PAP (step 1) and delivered to centralized PDP as well as attributes that 
need to implement that rules (step 2). When a subject invokes microservice endpoint (step 3), 
microservice code invokes centralized PDP via network call and PDP generates access control policy 
decision by evaluating the query input against access control rules and attributes (step 4). Based on PDP 
decision microservice enforce authorization (step 5). 
 
Figure 4 Centralized pattern with single PDP high-level architecture 
Several benefits of this pattern are [4, 11]: 
 security/development team can update access control rules without changing the source code, 
it enables centralized policy management, changes in policy may be deployed separately from 
microservices using them; 
 access control rule definitions can be left for development teams to implement, but left outside 
of the core business portion of source code to make policies discoverable, moreover some 
access control rules are “universal” and may be shared within a microservices/organization; 
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 access control rules may be used in operations environments to detect security anomalies, e.g. 
anomaly microservice behavior based on API call, on threat detection it is possible to 
dynamically re-create and apply new access control rules to mitigate security risk. 
To define access control rules development/operation team has to use some language or notation. An 
example is Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) and Next Generation Access Control 
(NGAC) that is a standard to implement policy rules description [12, 13]. However, XACML ended up 
failing because it required learning a separate, complicated syntax, causing more work for developers, 
and there were not many open source integrations [4]. 
This pattern badly affects latency due additional network calls of the remote PDP endpoint, but it can be 
mitigated by caching authorization policy decisions at microservice level [6]. It should be mentioned that 
PDP must be operated in high-availability mode due to resilience and availability issues. Application 
security architects should combine it with other patterns (e.g., authorization on API gateway level) in 
order to avoid “single-point-of-decision” and enforce “defense in depth” principle. 
2.2.3 Centralized pattern with embedded policy decision point 
In that pattern access control rules are defined centrally but stored and evaluated at microservice level 
(Figure 5). Access control rules is defined using PAP (step 1) and delivered to embedded PDP as well as 
attributes that need to implement that rules (step 2). When a subject invokes microservice endpoint 
(step 3), microservice code invokes PDP and PDP generates access control policy decision by evaluating 
the query input against access control rules and attributes (step 4). Based on PDP decision microservice 
enforce authorization (step 5) [14]. 
 
Figure 5 Centralized pattern with embedded PDP high-level architecture 
PDP code in that case can be implemented as microservice built-in library or sidecar in service mesh 
architecture [15-22]. Due to possible network/host failures and network latency it is advisable to 
implement embedded PDP as microservice library or sidecar on the same host with microservice. 
Embedded PDP usually store authorization policy and policy-related data in-memory to minimize 
external dependencies during authorization enforcement and get low latency [23]. Main difference from 
“Centralized pattern with single policy decision point” with caching approach is that authorization 
decisions do not store on the microservice side, up to date authorization policy are stored on 
microservice side instead. It should be mentioned that caching authorization decisions may lead to 
applying outdated authorization rules and access control violations. 
M.Mehta and T. Sandall presented [23, 24] a real case of using “Centralized pattern with embedded 
PDP” pattern to implement authorization on the microservices level (Figure 6): 
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 Policy portal and Policy repository is UI-based system for creating, managing and versioning 
access control rules; 
 Aggregator fetches data used in access control rules from all external sources and keeps it up to 
date; 
 Distributor pulls access control rules (from Policy repository) and data used in access control 
rules (from Aggregators) to distribute it among PDPs; 
 PDP (library) asynchronically pulls access control rules and data and keeps it up to date to 
enforce authorization by PEP component. 
 
Figure 6 Centralized pattern with embedded PDP (example) 
Benefits of this patterns are the same as for “Centralized pattern with single PDP” plus pattern does not 
badly affect latency due to embedding PDP on the microservice level.  
There are several challenges that have to be taken into account while applying this pattern: 
 this pattern relies on the manual or semi-manual access policy rules designed by security team 
that may be error-prone – security testing and verification practices should be implemented to 
avoid insecure configuration vulnerabilities; 
 application security architects should combine it with other patterns (e.g., authorization on the 
edge level) in order to avoid “single-point-of-decision” and enforce “defense in depth” principle; 
 it may be the case that some business-specific access control rules cannot be implemented in 
that way – application security architects should combine that pattern with "Decentralized 
pattern"; 
 application security architects should choose an approach of how to get authorization policy 
updates from the centralized PAP (e.g., PAP polling or publish-subscribe mechanism [6]): 
 development team has to securely use 3rd–party authorization components and describe access 
control policy using some formal language that in some cases may be overhead – “Decentralized 
pattern” may be enough to implement some simple access control policy. 
2.3. External entity identity propagation 
To make fine-granted authorization decision at the microservice level microservice has to understand 
caller context (e.g. user ID, user roles/groups). In order to allow internal service layer to enforce 
authorization edge layer has to propagate authenticated external entity identity (e.g., end-user context) 
along with a request to downstream microservices. One of the simplest way to propagate external 
entity identity is to re-use the access token received by the edge and pass it to internal microservices. It 
should be mentioned that approach is highly insecure due to possible external access token leakage and 
may decrease an attack surface because the communication relies on proprietary token-based system 
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implementation and internal microservices have to understand external access token [25]. This pattern 
also is not external access token agnostic, i.e. internal services have to support a wide range of 
authentication techniques to extract identity from different types of external tokens (e.g. JWT, cookie, 
OpenID Connect token). 
There are two patterns to pass the external entity identity from one microservice to another [6, 26]: 
 send the external entity identity as a clear or self-signed data structures; 
 send the external entity identity as a data structures signed by the trusted issuer. 
2.3.1 Send the external entity identity as a clear or self-signed data structures 
In that approach calling microservice extracts external entity identity from incoming request (e.g. via 
parsing incoming access token), creates data structure (e.g. JSON or self-signed JWT) with context and 
passes that on to an internal microservices [27] (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 Pattern “Send the user context as a clear or self-signed data structures” 
In this scenario recipient microservice has to trust the calling microservice - if the calling microservice 
want to violate access control rules, it can do so by setting any user/client ID or user roles it wants as the 
HTTP header [6]. That approach is applicable in a highly trusted environment in which every 
microservice is developed by trusted development team according with secure software development 
practices [28, 43]. 
2.3.2 Using a data structures signed by a trusted issuer 
In this pattern after the external request is authenticated by authentication service at the edge layer, a 
data structure representing external entity identity (e.g., contained user ID, user roles/groups or 
permissions) is generated, signed or encrypted by the trusted issuer and propagated to internal 
microservices [6, 25, 26, 29]. S. Thadeshwar [30] presented a real case of using that pattern: structure 
called “Passport” that contains user ID and its attributes and HMAC protected is created at the edge 
level for each incoming request, propagated to internal microservices and never exposes outside (Figure 
8): 
1. Edge authentication service (EAS) obtains secret key from the Key Management System. 
2. EAS receives an access token (may be e.g. in a cookie, JWT, OAuth2 token) from incoming 
request. 
3. EAS decrypts the access token, resolves the external entity identity and sends it to the internal 
services in the signed “Passport” structure. 
4. Internal services can extract user identity in order to enforce authorization (e.g. to implement 
identity-based authorization) using wrappers. 
5. If necessary, internal service can propagate “Passport” structure to downstream services in the 
call chain. 
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Figure 8 Using a data structures signed by a trusted issuer (example) 
It should be mentioned that pattern is external access token agnostic and allows to decouple external 
entity and its internal representation. 
2.4 Service-to-service authentication 
There are two common ways to implement service-to-service authentication [6]: 
 mutual transport layer security (mTLS); 
 token based, e.g. JSON Web Tokens (JWT). 
In mTLS approach each microservice can legitimately identify who it talks to, in addition to achieving 
confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data. Each microservice in the deployment has to carry a 
public/private key pair and uses that key pair to authenticate to the recipient microservices via mTLS. 
mTLS usually is implemented with a self-hosted Public Key Infrastructure [6, 26]. The main challenges 
using mTLS are: key provisioning and trust bootstrap, certificate revocation and key rotation. 
Token based approach works at the application layer. Token is a container and may contain caller ID 
(microservice ID) and its permissions (scopes). Caller microservice can obtain token by invoking special 
security token service using its own service ID and password and then attaches it to every outgoing 
requests e.g., via HTTP headers. In most cases, token-based authentication works over TLS that provides 
confidentiality and integrity of data in transit [6]. 
According to [6, 26, 33-36] mTLS is the most popular option to authenticate microservices. 
Network segmentation or firewalling pattern implements “trust-the-network” approach in which no 
security is enforced in service-to-service communication and currently not widely used by community as 
primary security mechanism [6, 31]. 
3. Recommendations for application security architects 
Based on our survey results, we came up with several recommendations for application security 
architects on authentication and authorization implementation. 
Summary on authorization implementation is presented in the table below (Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Pattern name Scalability Latency 3rd-party 
components 
dependencies 
Reconfigurat
ion on-the-
fly 
Decentralized pattern Low Low not in use Not 
supported 
Centralized pattern with single policy 
decision point 
High High in use Supported 
Centralized pattern with embedded 
policy decision point 
High Low in use Supported 
 
Recommendation on how to implement authorization are the following. 
1) To achieve scalability it is not advisable to hardcode authorization policy in source code 
(decentralized pattern), but use special language to express policy instead. The goal is to 
externalize/decouple authorization from code, and not just with a gateway/proxy that acts as a 
checkpoints. Recommended pattern for service-level authorization is “Centralized pattern with 
embedded PDP” due to its resilience and wide adoption. 
2) Authorization solution should be platform-level solution; dedicated team (e.g., Platform security 
team) must be accountable for development and operation of authorization solution as well as 
sharing microservice blueprint/library/components that implement authorization among 
development teams. 
3) Authorization solution should be based on widely used solution, because implementing custom 
solution has following cons [4]: 
 security or engineering team have to build and maintain custom solution; 
 it is necessary to build and maintain client library SDKs for every language used in 
system architecture; 
 necessity to train every developer on custom authorization service API and integration, 
and there’s no open source community to source information from. 
4) There is a probability that not all access control policy can be enforced by gateways/proxies and 
shared authorization library/components, so some specific access control rules still have to be 
implemented on microservice buisnes code level. In order to do that it is advisiable to have and 
use by microservice development teams simple questionary/check-list to uncover such security 
requriments and handle its properly during microservice development. 
5) It is advisable to implement “defense in depth” principle - enforce authorization on: 
 gateways and proxies level at a coarse level of granularity; 
 microservice level using shared authorization library/components to enforce fine-
granted decisions; 
 microservice business code level to implement business-specific access control rules. 
6) Access control policy formal procedures like development, approvement, rolling-out must be 
implemented. 
Summary on external entity identity propagation is presented in the table below (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Pattern name Applied 
environment 
3rd-party 
components 
dependencies 
External 
access token 
agnostic 
Ability to 
centralize 
Send the external entity identity as a 
clear or self-signed data structures 
Trusted not in use non-agnostic - 
Using a data structures signed by an 
trusted issuer 
Untrusted In use agnostic + 
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Recommendation on how to propagate external entity identity among microservices are the following. 
1) In order to implement external access token agnostic and extendable system decouple access 
tokens issued for external entity from its internal representation. Use single data structure to 
represent and propagate external entity identity among microservices. Edge-level service has to 
verify incoming external access token, issue internal entity representation structure and 
propagate it to downstream services. 
2) Using an internal entity representation structure signed (symmetric or asymmetric encryption) 
by a trusted issuer is recommended pattern adopted by community [30]. 
3) Internal entity representation structure should be extensible to enable add more claims that 
may lead to low latency. 
4) Internal entity representation structure must not be exposed outside (e.g., to browser or 
external device). 
Recommendations on how to proper implement authentication in microservice-based systems are the 
following. 
1) mTLS is widely used and recommended pattern to implement service-to-service authentication. 
2) mTLS solution should be platform-level solution based on widely used solution, because 
implementing proprietary solution has following cons: 
a. in-house development must be highly experienced in cryptography in order to 
implement it in a right way; 
b. in-house development team will have to build, maintain it and fix vulnerabilities; 
c. it is necessary to train every developer on custom authentication service API and 
integration, and there's no open source community to source information from. 
3) dedicated team (e.g., Platform security team) must be accountable for development and 
operation of mTLS solution as well as sharing among development teams microservice 
blueprint/library/components that implement it. 
4) It is advisable to implement “defense in depth” principle, e.g. enforce authentication using 
network segmentation or firewalling as a secondary security control. 
4. Related work 
Security architecture patterns for microservice-based systems has been the topic of a number of surveys 
and review articles, as well as standards. 
Vale et al. [37] conducted a systematic mapping to reveal adopted security mechanisms for 
microservice-based systems. They focused only on security mechanisms and examined 26 papers 
published from November 2018 to March 2019. 
Hannousse et al. [38] conducted a similar investigation to Vale et al. [37] study. Their study is broader in 
several ways: they included published papers since 2011 and besides security mechanisms, they also 
focused on identifying security threats and the applicability of proposed solutions regarding their 
execution platforms and architectural layers. 
Yu et al. [39] surveyed work related to security risks for microservices-based fog applications, and 
argued that security issues arise in four system aspects: containers, data, permissions and network 
security. 
NIST published [3, 21] a standards on microservice-based system security. NIST analyzed the multiple 
implementation options available for each individual core security feature (authentication and access 
management, service discovery, secure communication protocols, security monitoring, 
availability/resiliency improvement techniques, load balancing and throttling, integrity assurance 
techniques and handling of session persistence) and configuration options in architectural frameworks, 
and developed security strategies that counter threats specific to microservice-based systems.  
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Several research papers propose authorization schemes and policies related to microservice-based 
systems. Fu et al. [40] by studying the traditional access control technologies derived its limitations and 
shortcomings in the microservice environment, and proposed an access control optimization model 
based on role based access control (RBAC). Triartono et al. [41] proposed a model to implement RBAC 
on OAuth 2.0 using Laravel framework. Liu et al. [42] introduced security boundary of basic platform, 
business system and system function in the intelligent campus, defined a hybrid access control strategy 
based on group based access control, RBAC and hierarchical policy-based access control models. Those 
works mainly focus on access control policy formal design and verification and do not pay much 
attention to design/architecture issues. 
Compared with the related works our study is more narrow and concentrated on authentication and 
authorization only in order to get deeper results. Moreover, besides research papers analysis we also 
analyzed presentations at the major security conferences. 
5. Conclusion and further work 
Correctly implemented authentication and authorization functions are the basis for further step of 
microservice-based infrastructure hardening and software maturity program improvement. In the 
survey, we identified industry best practices in authentication and authorization architecture patterns, 
its advantages and disadvantages and its applicability depending on environment characteristic. For 
each described patterns we reviewed its advantages and disadvantages that could be used as decision-
making criteria for security architects, considering authentication and authorization implementation in 
service-oriented environment. 
Microservices creates new security challenges: 
 increase attack surface of modern applications; 
 decrease effectiveness of traditional logging systems that relies on centric-based log-
aggregation architecture; 
 blur of development lifecycle across multiple components of application instead on monolithic 
application; 
 increase traffic level due to growing number of communications between microservices. 
The challenges requires novel methods of monitoring and threat detection even based machine learning 
techniques [44, 45] that take into account the specificity of microservice operations. 
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